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New Legal Frontier:
Mass Information Loss and Security Breach
Chad Pinson*
I. ONE IDENTITY THIEF, ONE VICTIM - A THING OF THE PAST
Over the past several years, "identity theft" has been a buzz phrase in
the media and a fertile ground for lawsuits. The brazenness and ingenuity of
the thieves who steal identities certainly makes for an intriguing story, and
everyone can imagine themselves as a potential victim. Children steal the
identities of their parents, and parents steal the identities of their children.
Sophisticated identity-theft rings that have exhausted the identities of male
victims begin to cross-dress to steal and use the identities of women. Waiters
at restaurants use card-swipe machines to steal individual credit card num-
bers. ATM machines are compromised. Mailboxes are robbed. Purses and
wallets are stolen. Checkbooks are intercepted before reaching their intended
recipient.
Countless articles have been written on these crimes, their victims, the
criminals who commit them, and even the law applicable to such crimes.
Generally, although the facts may be sensational, the story is the same. One
victim has his or her personal information, checks, or credit card stolen. The
thief then makes purchases, opens accounts, and obtains goods and services
in the name of the victim. The thief is rarely caught, and even more rarely
sued in a civil case by the victim. Instead, the financial institutions and
credit reporting agencies associated with the fraudulent accounts and
purchases are sued by the identity-theft victim under a variety of legal theo-
ries, including claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, and various state common law theories of liability.
II. THE NEW FRONTIER - MASS DATA LOSS AND BREACH
What was once an aberration in the news and the courts has now be-
come front-page news - the mass data loss or mass security breach. In the
past two to three years, news articles and lawsuits related to mass data loss
and mass security breaches have exploded into the forefront of public con-
sciousness. There are countless stories of mass security breach or mass data
loss on the front page of every paper in the country. The online Identity
Theft Resource Center reports that, as of May 15, 2007, 110 breaches of
databases containing sensitive information have been reported since the be-
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ginning of the year.' In 2006 alone, over 312 separate incidents of mass data
loss or mass security breach occurred, exposing the identifying personal or
consumer information of over nineteen million individuals.2 And, in 2005-
2006, at least seventy high-profile laptop thefts resulted in the loss and com-
promise of over thirty-two million consumer records.3
For example, a consultant reviewing pension data for the Neiman Mar-
cus Group had computer equipment stolen containing Social Security num-
bers, addresses, and salary information of around 160,000 employees.4
The Texas Attorney General sued RadioShack, charging that the elec-
tronics retailer improperly disposed of thousands of customer records con-
taining addresses and credit card numbers.5
The computer network of TJX, the parent company of TJ Maxx and
Marshalls, was hacked, exposing approximately forty-five million consum-
ers' credit and debit card numbers to the hackers.6
CitiFinancial used UPS to send a box of computer tapes containing the
personal identifiers and financial habits of its customers from New Jersey to
a data processing center in Allen, Texas. 7 The box of tapes, which contained
Social Security numbers, account information, and other data on 3.9 million
people, never arrived.8
LexisNexis reported that the names, addresses, and Social Security
numbers of about 30,000 people may have come into the possession of
thieves.9 The information was stored on massive consumer databases, and
1. Identity Theft Resource Center 2007 Breach List, http://idtheftmostwanted.org/
ITRC%20Breach%20Report%720202006.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
2. Identity Theft Resource Center 2006 Disclosures of U.S. Data Incidents, http://
idtheftmostwanted.org/ITRC%20Breach%20Report%20202006.pdf (last vis-
ited Sept. 5, 2007).
3. Bryce Whitty, Stolen Laptops, Exposed Data and Identity Theft, Aug. 23, 2006,
http://www.technibble.com/stolen-laptops-exposed-data-and-identity-theft/
#more- 119.
4. See Pamela Yip & Maria Halkias, Neiman Employees' Data Stolen: No Evi-
dence that IDs were Target in Computer Equipment Theft, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Apr. 25, 2007, at ID.
5. See Barbara Ramirez, Store in Portland Sued by the State AG: Customers'
Financial Information was Found in Garbage Bin Out Back, CORPUS CHRISTI
CALLER-TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at B1.
6. See Leslie Brooks Suzukamo, Breaking Rules, Leaking Data: Personal Info at
Risk When Workers Violate Company Security Policies, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, Apr. 27, 2007, at Cl.
7. See Laura Smitherman, Missing Data is Latest in Rash of Breaches, Consumers
are Warned to Head Off Identity Theft, BALT. SUN, June 8, 2005, at IA.
8. Id.
9. See Tom Zeller, Jr., Another Data Broker Reports a Breach, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 2005, at C1.
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was accessed by persons making unauthorized use of the passwords of legiti-
mate subscribers.0
CardSystems Solutions Inc., which processes credit card and other pay-
ments for banks and merchants, was attacked by a virus-like computer script.
Information on nearly forty million cardholders of multiple brands, including
Mastercard and Visa, was potentially exposed.l
ChoicePoint, a data storage company based in Georgia, inadvertently
sold consumer information to a thief posing as an executive with a Los Ange-
les financial company. A subsequent investigation revealed that records on
nearly 145,000 people were compromised.12
The University of Georgia reported that a computer hacker entered a
computer database and gained access to the Social Security numbers of ap-
proximately 1,600 employees. This followed closely on the revelation of a
previous security breach during which hackers gained access to a server con-
taining the names, birth dates, credit card information, and Social Security
numbers of students who applied to the University since 2002.13
Black Hills State University in South Dakota accidentally published the
Social Security numbers of fifty-six students on its website. 14
A laptop containing the Social Security numbers of about 2,000 current
and former school employees from Springfield City Schools in Ohio was
stolen from a state auditor's home.15
An unencrypted disk containing the Social Security numbers, health
plan identification numbers, and names of approximately 75,000 Blue Cross
and Blue Shield customers disappeared. The disk was later recovered.16
A Bank of America employee allegedly accessed customer profiles and
supplied them to a sophisticated identity theft ring that may have stolen over
10. Id.
11. See Joe Del Bruno, Another Breach in Data Security: 40 Million Credit Card
Customers of Various Brands May be Exposed, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 18,
2005, at Al.
12. See Bobby White, Few Laws Require Data Theft be Public, FT. WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, June 26, 2005, at Fl.
13. See Kelly Simmons, Hackers Breach Database at UGA, ATLANTA J. &
CONST. Sept. 29, 2005, at C2.
14. Black Hills State University Meets With Students to Alert Them of Possible
Identity Disclosure, U.S. ST. NEWS, Apr. 11, 2007.
15. Andrew McHinn, Stolen Laptop had info on Workers at Springfield Schools,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 17, 2007, at A6.
16. Associated Press, Insurer Recovers Missing Data; Disc Had Information on
75,000 Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield Members, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Mar.
15, 2007, at E4.
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$12 million from customer accounts over a two-year period.17 Just a year
earlier, Bank of America lost, and was unable to locate, the backup tapes
containing the identities of 1.2 million individuals, including their names and
Social Security numbers.Is
The University of Texas' computer system was hacked, and the identi-
fying information of over 175,197,000 students, employees, and alumni was
downloaded. 19
The University of Michigan Credit Union in Ann Arbor discarded, but
failed to shred, documents containing the personal identifying information of
some of its members, resulting in the identity theft of some of those
members.20
The University of North Texas' computer system was accessed by hack-
ers, exposing the personal identifiers of almost 39,000 students and alumni.21
DSW Shoe Warehouse learned that the identifying information (or
credit card numbers) of 1.4 million customers may have been stolen.22
The U.S. Department of Commerce admitted that 1,100 laptops were
unaccounted for, including several that contain U.S. Census Bureau data such
as names and social security numbers.23
A U.S. Transportation Security Administration hard drive containing
Social Security numbers and banking information of approximately 100,000
Homeland Security employees went missing from a secured area at T.S.A.
headquarters.24
17. See Three Women Held On Bank Fraud Charges, PROVIDENCE J. BULL, July
19, 2006, at BO.
18. See Ann Carrns, Bank of America Is Missing Tapes With Card Data, WALL
ST. J. ABSTRACTS, Feb. 28, 2005, at B2; see also Rick Rothacker and Andrew
Shain, Bank of America Says Tapes With Customer Data Lost: Bank Notifies
1.2 Million Federal Workers, Including U.S. Senators, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Feb. 26, 2005, at IA.
19. See Robert Lemos, Defending Your Identity: Hardly a Week Goes By Without
Companies and Universities Losing Digital Identities. What Can Be Done?,
PC MAG., July 1, 2006, at 143.
20. See Stolen Data Leads To Identity Theft, COMPUTERWORLD, June 12, 2006, at
10.
21. See Josh Baugh, Server Hacked at UNT: Denton 39,000 Told To Take Precau-
tions, Check for Identity Theft, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 9, 2005, at lB.
22. See The Week In Review, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 24, 2005, at E2.
23. See Alan Sipress, 1,100-plus U.S. Laptops Are Missing, Included Among The
Loss Are 250 From The Census Bureau, Which Contain Data From Many
Families, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 22, 2006, at A13.
24. Matthew M. Johnson, TSA Still Not Sure if Missing Hard Drive Was En-
crypted, CONG. Q.: HOMELAND SECURITY, May 15, 2007.
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In two separate incidents, the loss or theft of laptops from the Depart-
ment of Veteran's Affairs created a politically charged story, and placed the
personal information of over twenty-six million veterans at risk.25
Il. A REALISTIC SCENARIO IN THE MODERN MASS-DATA-
BREACH ENVIRONMENT
It is 10 p.m., and your mobile phone is ringing. Whether you are a
lawyer that represents consumers, or in-house counsel for a business that
houses the personal information of either employees or consumers, the con-
tents of the phone call will be the same. The only differences will be the
messenger-a victimized consumer, a very nervous IT manager, or a stern
FBI or Secret Service agent-informing you that a very large database con-
taining sensitive personal information about your client, employees, or your
customers has been compromised.
If you fall on one side of the problem, your mind races: "How many
names were on that database?" A few phone calls later and you have the
answer: approximately 250,000. You ask yourself the crucial questions:
How did this happen? What do I do next? What is my company's potential
exposure?
If you fall on the other side of the problem, you have similar questions:.
How do I protect my client from further harm? Can I bring a claim against
the company who allowed the data to be exposed? What claim? How much
is this case worth?
This is no longer an implausible scenario. The loss of highly sensitive
personal information has become unnervingly commonplace. Thieves are
now targeting this sort of information as never before. Large amounts of
data are making their way onto tiny disks and laptops that do not enjoy the
same sort of protection and security as typical corporate mainframes. Corpo-
rations are communicating more and more through electronic transmission of
data, and are also increasing their presence on the internet. All of these fac-
tors, and many others, suggest mass data loss and mass security breaches are
here to stay, with more incidents, not less, occurring in the future.
IV. CORPORATE DUTIES AND EXPOSURE IN A MASS BREACH OR
DATA Loss
The costs associated with mitigating these security breaches can be stag-
gering.26 When credit card information is compromised, accounts must be
checked for discrepancies and closed, and new cards issued. When social
security numbers are compromised along with personal identifying informa-
25. See Peter Rundlet & Denis McDonough, Identity Theft: Securing Sensitive
Data, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 18, 2006, at A23.
26. See Sharon Gaudin, Security Breaches Cost $90 to $305 Per Lost Record, IN-
FORMATION WEEK, Apr. 11, 2007, http://www.informationweek.com/story/
showArticle.jhtml?articlelD= 199000222.
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tion, identity theft looms large as a troubling possibility. Unlike credit card
information, the loss of personal identifying information along with social
security numbers may require years of vigilant monitoring, if not entire life-
times, as identity thieves may lay in wait for years before striking.27
Parties who bear the cost of repairing the damage caused by information
security breaches have been actively seeking to shift these costs to the orga-
nizations in control of the systems that were compromised. To date, what
has emerged from these efforts is a patchwork approach without a unifying
theme. A number of states have enacted statutes requiring possessors of per-
sonal information to take reasonable measures to safeguard the information,
and to notify individuals when their information is compromised.28 Federal
lawmakers have proposed similar measures. 29 In addition to these legislative
approaches, individuals whose information has been compromised have
sought legal redress against organizations from which their information was
taken using a variety of statutory and common law theories.30 These cases
may prove to be the leading edge in an effort to set new standards for the
care and safeguarding of personal information.
This article elucidates the legal risks faced by organizations that hold
sensitive personal information by examining in detail these emerging sources
of potential liability. These risks may be analyzed by first addressing the
duties placed on such businesses by existing and proposed state and federal
statutes. The current mix of statutes - evolving on an ongoing basis - sets
forth broad guidelines regarding the implementation of reasonable data se-
curity measures, and imposes notification requirements on businesses that
suffer data security breaches. Second, this article examines liability exposure
under existing statutory and common law frameworks. The extent of this
exposure to risk remains highly uncertain. However, current litigation is
likely to begin the process of clarifying the boundaries within which busi-
nesses must operate in order to minimize their exposure to liability for infor-
mation loss.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND POTENTIAL CLAIMS
The news accounts of mass data breach and loss possess a unifying
theme: each scenario presents the specter of liability for an entity that has
suffered information loss via some form of a data security breach. Busi-
nesses experiencing such losses must quickly and accurately conduct a two-
part analysis if liability is to be minimized or avoided altogether. First, the
27. See Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and The Architecture of Vulnera-
bility, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1246 (2006) (noting "Once the card is cancelled,
the crime ends. With identity theft, the crime can continue, for personal infor-
mation works like an 'access card' that cannot be readily deactivated.").
28. See infra notes 23-58 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 66-130 and accompanying text.
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affected business must assess its duties to the affected consumers under state
and federal statutory law. Second, the affected business must recognize
grounds for potential liability under both statutory and common law
frameworks. To be sure, these twin considerations implicate overlapping
bodies of law, and are far from distinct. However, this framework is a useful
tool for businesses faced with making snap decisions in the face of
uncertainty.
A. Duties Under State and Federal Statutory Law
Thus far, state legislatures have been very eager to pass legislation that
imposes duties on entities that suffer mass data loss or a mass security
breach.31 Federal law, however, has lagged behind.32
1. Duties Under State Statutory Law
The recent proliferation of high-profile security breaches has prompted
a number of states to enact statutes setting standards for safeguarding per-
sonal information, and notifying individuals when their information is com-
promised.33 This tidal wave of security breaches that prompted the current
legislative response was itself precipitated by the passage in 2003 of Califor-
nia's law requiring businesses that own or license personal information about
a California resident to disclose any breach of the security of that information
to the resident.34
a) The California Data Security and Notification Law
The California law has served as a model for many of the data security
laws subsequently passed by other states.35 Accordingly, any discussion of
statutory sources of liability facing organizations engaged in the collection or
retention of sensitive personal information must begin with this law.36
The California data security law sets forth three general requirements
relevant to businesses dealing with personal information.37 These require-
31. See infra notes 23-58 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 23-58 and accompanying text.
34. See Bob Zeller Jr., Data Security Laws Seem Likely, So Consumers and Busi-
nesses Vie to Shape Them, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, at 3C (noting that "Cali-
fornia's data security notification law is largely credited with forcing
companies nationwide to tell consumers about data breaches"); see also Edito-
rial, Digital Safeguards, BALT. SUN, June 13, 2005, at lOA ("We're more often
learning about these security breaches because of a 2003 California law requir-
ing customer notification.").
35. See supra Part VII.
36. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.80-.84 (2006).
37. §§ 1798.81, 1798.81.5, 1798.82(a).
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ments may loosely be classified as: (1) notification, (2) reasonable security,
and (3) data destruction.38 These requirements have been adopted in varying
degrees by other states, and serve as a blueprint for federal legislation.
(1) Notification
By far the most prominent provision in the statute, California's notifica-
tion law provides that:
Any agency, person, or business who conducts business in Cali-
fornia, and that owns or licenses computerized data containing
personal information,39 shall disclose "any breach of the security
of the system following discovery or notification of the breach in
the security of the data to any resident of California whose unen-
crypted40 personal information was, or is reasonably believed to
have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.4'
The notification must be made "in the most expedient time possible and
without unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law en-
forcement . . . or any measures necessary to determine the scope of the
breach and restore the reasonable integrity of the data systems."42 Notifica-
tion "may be delayed if a law enforcement agency determines that the notifi-
cation will impede a criminal investigation."43 "Breach of the security of the
system" is defined as an "unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that
compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal informa-
tion maintained by the person or business." 44 An exception to this definition
is made for "[g]ood faith acquisition of personal information by an employee
or agent of the person or business for the purposes of the person or business
38. §§ 1798.81, 1798.81.5, 1798.82(a).
39. This language suggests that a security breach of non-computerized records
would not trigger the duties and liabilities of the statute.
40. Because the California statute is limited to the loss or exposure of unencrypted
information, at least some recent high-profile mass data loss incidents would
not have triggered the California statute.
41. However, if the computerized data is not "owned" by the business, but rather is
merely being "maintained" on behalf of an owner or licensee, the maintaining
entity must notify the owner or licensee "of any breach of the security of the
data immediately following discovery, if the personal information was, or is
reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person." Cal.






...provided that the personal information is not used or subject to further
unauthorized disclosure."45 "Personal information" is defined as:
[A]n individual's first name or first initial and last name in combi-
nation with any one or more of the following data elements, when
either the name or the data elements are not encrypted:
(1) Social security number.
(2) Driver's license number or California Identification Card
number.
(3) Account number, credit or debit card number, in combination
with any required security code, access code, or password that
would permit access to an individual's financial account.46
Personal information does not include information made lawfully avail-
able to the public from "federal, state, or local government records."47 Once
the notification requirement is triggered, the agency may provide notice ei-
ther in writing,48 by e-mail,49 or by substitute notice.50 Substitute notice may
be made if the agency, person, or business demonstrates "that the cost of
providing notice would exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars
($250,000), or that the affected class of subject persons to be notified ex-
ceeds 500,000, or the agency does not have sufficient contact information."5'
Substitute notice consists of "e-mail notice when the agency has an e-mail
address for the subject persons, conspicuous posting of the notice on the
agency's Web site page, if the agency maintains one, [and,] notification to
major statewide media."52 The statute further provides that:
an agency that maintains its own notification procedures as part of
an information security policy for the treatment of personal infor-
mation and is otherwise consistent with the timing requirements of
[the statute], shall be deemed to be in compliance with the notifi-
cation requirements of this section if it notifies subject persons in
45. Id.
46. § 1798.82(e).
47. §§ 1798.29(f), 1798.82(f).
48. §§ 1798.29(g)(1), 1798.82(g)(1).
49. §§ 1798.29(g)(2), 1798.82(g)(2). If electronic notice is given, the requirements
regarding electronic records and signatures provided for in § 7001 of Title 15
of the United States Code must be met. Id.
50. §§ 1798.29(g)(3), 1798.82(g)(3). When the cost of providing notice exceeds
two hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), the affected class exceeds
500,000, or sufficient contact information does not exist, substitute notice may
be given. Id.
51. Id.
52. §§ 1798.29(g)(3)(A)-(C), 1798.82(g)(3)(A)-(C), 1798.29(g)(3)(A)-(C).
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accordance with its policies in the event of a breach of security of
the system. 53
(2) Implementation of Security
In addition to requiring notification in the event of a security breach,
California law requires businesses that own or license personal information
about Californians to "implement and maintain reasonable security proce-
dures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information," and "to
protect the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use,
modification, or disclosure."54 This section defines "personal information"
the same way as in the notification provision, except "medical information"
is included as an additional type of data businesses are required to secure. 55
Moreover, the definition specifically excludes information that is "lawfully
made available to the general public from federal, state, or local government
records."56
The law also excludes certain statutorily defined entities from its cover-
age, as well as a "business that is regulated by state or federal law providing
greater protection to personal information than that provided by this section
in regard to the subjects addressed by this section."57 For such businesses,
"[c]ompliance with that state or federal law shall be deemed compliance with
this section with regard to those subjects."58
The law also requires a "business that discloses personal information
about a California resident pursuant to a contract with a nonaffiliated third
party" to "require by contract that the third party implement and maintain
reasonable security procedures and practices."59 Thus, the law reaches be-
yond companies that merely own personal information by requiring the addi-
tion of specific contractual language to information sales and licensing
agreements.
(3) Record Destruction
Finally, the California law requires businesses to:
take all reasonable steps to destroy, or arrange for the destruction
of a customer's records within its custody or control containing
personal information which is no longer to be retained by the busi-
ness by (1) shredding, (2) erasing, or (3) otherwise modifying the









personal information in those records to make it unreadable or un-
decipherable through any means. 60
(4) Private Right Of Action
Along with the duties of the California statute, the law also provides that
"any customer injured by a violation of this title may institute a civil action
to recover damages."61 "Customer" is defined as "an individual who pro-
vides personal information to a business for the purpose of purchasing or
leasing a product or obtaining a service from the business."62 In addition,
"any business that violates, proposes to violate, or has violated" any provi-
sion of the California law may be enjoined.63 Notably, however, the law
does not provide a cause of action for an individual who does not meet the
strictures of the "customer" definition, yet whose personal information is
compromised while in the possession of a business.
With respect to enforcement, the California law provides that any cus-
tomer injured by a violation of any of the provisions discussed above may
institute a civil action to recover damages.64 In addition, any business that
"violates, proposes to violate, or has violated" any provision of the California
law may be enjoined.65
(5) Lingering Questions
While path-breaking in many respects, the California statute fails to ad-
dress a host of important questions, and is rife with ambiguities. First, by
requiring notification when a business "reasonably believes" that a California
resident's personal information has been acquired by an unauthorized person,
the statute implies that businesses may be charged with inquiry notice of
security breaches. This, in turn, raises the question of whether the statute
creates an implicit duty on the part of businesses to conduct regular inspec-
tions of their databanks for possible security breaches. Perhaps even more
troubling, the statute mandates notification regardless of whether the breach
creates any real risk or threat that actual harm will befall the persons whose
information is (or is reasonably believed to be) compromised. . Risk-averse
businesses may engage in preemptive notification, causing needless parox-
ysms of anxiety among the general public. In fact, in many cases, a high-
profile mass data loss or mass security breach does not result in a singe case
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Second, once a business has determined that a breach has occurred, the
statute provides little guidance as to what constitutes "expedient" notifica-
tion. Nor does the statute indicate whether the expediency of the notice
should be measured from the time that a business actually discovers the
breach, or from the time that a business should have discovered the breach.
The indeterminacy inherent in the statute's command that notice be expedi-
ently given is compounded by the allowance for reasonable delay for the
purpose of taking measures necessary to determine the scope of the breach
and restore reasonable data system integrity. The tension between the com-
mand of expedient notice and the allowance for reasonable delay cannot be
definitively resolved by reference to the language of the statute, giving rise to
the need for judicial interpretation and situational decision-making.
Third, once a business has determined that a breach has occurred and is
prepared to give notice, it must determine the type and extent of notification
warranted under the circumstances. 66 The statute provides little guidance re-
garding the content of the notification, and leaves open the possibility that
"inadequate" notice will be deemed a failure to notify. For example, must a
company merely inform persons affected by the breach that a breach has
occurred, or must it offer advice regarding appropriate defensive or remedial
steps a person may take - such as contacting a credit reporting agency or
purchasing credit monitoring - to mitigate any possible negative outcomes?
Moreover, businesses faced with the challenge of identifying the proper in-
formation to relay to affected persons must simultaneously contend with the
task of deciding which persons to notify. To take but one example, who
must be notified when a business determines that an unauthorized person
viewed, but did not download, a large quantity of personal information?
How certain can the business be that the information was "acquired" by the
unauthorized person? Does the length of the view make a difference?
Fourth, the statute indicates that businesses may circumvent the notifi-
cation requirement merely by encrypting their databanks. 67 The statute is
silent, however, as to whether minimum standards apply to the type of en-
cryption used, or whether any type of encryption is sufficient to take advan-
tage of this "safe-harbor" provision. In addition, the statute provides no
guidance as to whether notification is necessary if a business reasonably be-
lieves that an unauthorized person has the ability to decipher encrypted data.
For instance, what if the unauthorized person is a current or former employee
who has access to the data; or what if the hacker acquires the key to decoding
the cipher text?
Lastly, with respect to the requirement that businesses implement rea-
sonable security measures, the statute fails to provide any indication regard-
ing the type of measures required.68 One may infer from the notification
66. § 1798.82(g).




statute that encryption is per se a reasonable security measure. The statute
provides no guidance, however, as to whether or how far a business must
extend its protective efforts beyond the implementation of encryption. Busi-
nesses faced with this requirement are left adrift by the statute's penurious
nature.
Despite these and other shortcomings, the California statute has served
as a model for numerous state legislatures seeking to enact data security leg-
islation. Although tracking the California statute in many respects, several of
these statutes contain variations on the California theme worth examining in
detail.
b) Representative Statutes of Other States
Since the passage of the California statute in 2003, a number of other
states have enacted data security statutes modeled closely on the California
law. Over thirty states now have either passed legislation governing some
aspect of a mass security breach/data loss, or have legislation pending. As a
general rule, these states have adhered closely to the structure of the Califor-
nia statute by requiring notification to consumers upon discovery of a breach
in the security of a data system containing the consumers' personal informa-
tion. Many of these states, however, have included innovations in their stat-
utes differentiating their notification and security requirements from those
implemented in the California statute.
(1) Element Of Harm
One of the most noteworthy innovations is the inclusion of a "harm"
requirement. States adopting the "harm" standard differ from California in
that they require notification only in the event that the security breach is
likely to result in some form of harm to the affected individuals, whereas the
California statute requires notification in the event of a "breach" without con-
sidering whether harm may result. Florida's statute provides an illustrative
example of this requirement. The Florida statute provides that:
notification is not required if, after an appropriate investigation or
after consultation with relevant federal, state, and local agencies
responsible for law enforcement, the person reasonably deter-
mines that the breach has not and will not likely result in harm to
the individuals whose personal information has been acquired and
accessed. Such a determination must be documented in writing
and the documentation must be maintained for five years. 69
The harm requirement represents an effort by states to rationalize the
notification requirement; such states seek to reduce "overnotification" by re-
quiring notification only when harm is likely to result. This rationalization
may cause long-term difficulties, however, as it introduces an additional un-
69. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(10)(a) (2005).
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defined variable into the notification process. While potentially burdensome,
the California statute (and those following its lead) possesses the virtue of
unambiguous certainty - if a security breach occurs, then notification is
required.
States adopting the harm requirement place upon businesses the respon-
sibility of determining in a relatively short period of time the potential long-
term effects of a security breach. Given that an erroneous assessment of no
harm followed by a decision not to notify is likely to result in civil liability,
businesses faced with this choice are likely to err on the side of notification
until some judicially defined parameters are established for judging the like-
lihood of harm and the reasonableness of such assessments. The upshot,
however, is that in the long-term, the "harm" requirement will likely dampen
"over-notification," making instances where notification is provided all the
more effective by making them more rare.
(2) Threshold Level Of Affected Consumers
A second innovation found in a number of state statutes is a requirement
that a business provide notice to consumer reporting agencies upon discovery
of an information security breach affecting more than a threshold number of
persons. A good example of this type of provision may be found in the Texas
data security statute, which provides that:
[i]f a person is required by this section to notify at one time more
than 10,000 persons of a breach of system security, the person
shall also notify, without unreasonable delay, all consumer report-
ing agencies, as defined by 15 U.S.C. 1681a, that maintain files on
consumers on a nationwide basis, of the timing, distribution, and
content of the notices.70
Provisions such as this would seem to promote efficiency by requiring a
single actor to provide notification regarding the same information to both
consumers and all credit reporting agencies nearly simultaneously, as op-
posed to relying on each individual consumer to contact all of the credit
reporting agencies separately. However, it is unclear precisely what actions
may/must be taken by credit reporting agencies upon receipt of such
notification.
(3) No Private Right of Action Under State Statute
In addition to these innovations, a number of states have adopted stat-
utes that provide only for administrative enforcement of their provisions.
Unlike California, which explicitly provides a statutory cause of action for
individual consumers in the event that a business fails to abide by the stric-
tures of the data security law, the statutes of these states are silent as to the
70. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 48.103(h) (2006), repealed by 2007 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. ch. 885 (West).
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ability of individual consumers to pursue claims against offending busi-
nesses. For example, New York's data security statute provides:
[W]henever the Attorney General shall believe from evidence sat-
isfactory to him that there is a violation of this article he may
bring an action in the name and on behalf of the people of the
State of New York, in a court of justice having jurisdiction to
issue an injunction, to enjoin and restrain the continuation of such
violation.71
States providing only for administrative enforcement of their data secur-
ity statutes likely will not bar pertinent common law causes of action by
aggrieved consumers. However, the statutes themselves will not serve as a
source for duty or liability in those cases.
(4) Unique Innovations
In addition to those discussed above, a number of additional statutory
innovations have been adopted by individual states. The Nevada data secur-
ity statute provides:
[A] data collector who provides notification may commence an
action for damages against a person that unlawfully obtained or
benefited from personal information obtained from records main-
tained by the data collector."72 If the data collector prevails, it
"may be awarded damages which may include, without limitation,
the reasonable costs of notification, reasonable attorney's fees and
costs and punitive damages when appropriate.73
The Florida data security statute provides that in the event of a breach of
security, "[n]otification must be made no later than forty-five days following
the determination of the breach . . ."74 This provision is significant in that it
establishes a firm deadline for providing notice. The Florida statute also pro-
vides for administrative fines of $1,000 per day for the first thirty days of
nondisclosure, $50,000 for each thirty-day period thereafter up to 180 days,
at which time a maximum fine of $500,000 is imposed.7T The Rhode Island
data security statute provides for a private cause of action for violations, ad-
ditional civil penalties for "willful, intentional, or reckless" violations, and
provides a safe harbor for businesses that provide notice "within ninety (90)
days of the date the business knew that it had failed to provide the informa-
tion, timely information, all the information, or the accurate information, re-
71. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa(6)(a) (2005).
72. NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A.900 (2005).
73. Id.
74. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(l)(a) (2005).
75. Id. at § 817.5681(b).
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spectively."76 Finally, New York's data security statute sets forth mandatory
contents for any notice given, including "contact information for the person
or business making the notification and a description of the categories of
information that were, or are reasonably believed to have been, acquired by a
person without valid authorization."77
Although the data security statutes of the several states closely track
each other in both structure and content, they differ on a number of important
points. Due to these differences, businesses possessing personal consumer
information of residents from multiple states should develop a detailed un-
derstanding of the nuances of multiple state statutes in order to craft an effec-
tive response to a security breach. The compliance difficulties generated by
this dizzying multiplicity of statutes cries out for a preemptive and compre-
hensive federal solution. At present, however, businesses are left with the
unenviable task of canvassing a vast array of statutes any time they experi-
ence a potential data security breach or data loss.
c) Basic Corporate Compliance with Multiple State Laws
The momentum generated by the recent enactment of laws dealing with
the maintenance and loss of personal information is likely to gain strength
over the coming months and years, particularly if additional instances of in-
formation security breaches by high-profile businesses are discovered. Busi-
nesses that store or deal with personal information on employees, customers,
or individuals residing in multiple states must keep pace with each of these
laws and their individual nuances. The companies best-positioned to negoti-
ate these new laws are those that (1) adopt robust information security prac-
tices and policies including the use of encryption or redaction and require
third-party information customers and business partners to do the same, (2)
institute additional practices and policies to insure that data stored on non-
mainframe devices such as laptops, disks, and magnetic tapes is transferred
and maintained in a secure manner, (3) take care to dispose of unneeded
personal information in accordance with the most stringent state law stan-
dards, (4) monitor their systems and databases for instances of data breach or
data loss, and (5) provide timely and appropriate notice to both consumers
and law enforcement authorities upon learning of any actual mass data loss
or data breach.
2. Proposed Federal Statutory Law
In light of the proliferation of high-profile mass data compromise, as
well as the favorable reception of state laws requiring notification of infor-
mation security breaches and requiring reasonable security measures, federal
lawmakers have proposed a number of bills setting national information se-
curity standards. These bills reflect the diversity of views and approaches
76. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-9(d).
77. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899.aa(7) (2005).
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evident at the state level. Significantly, many of these bills contain provi-
sions that would preempt many, if not all, of the previously mentioned state
laws discussed above.
a) Senate Bill 1178
For example, Senate Bill 1178, introduced by Senators Smith, Stevens,
Inouye, and Pryor, was approved by the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation on April 25, 2007. The bill applies to any "sole proprie-
torship, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, or
other commercial entity, and any charitable, educational, or nonprofit or-
ganization, that acquires, maintains, or utilizes sensitive personal informa-
tion. "78 "Sensitive personal information" is defined as:
an individual's name, address, or telephone number combined
with 1 or more of the following data elements related to that
individual:
(i) Social security account number, taxpayer identification num-
ber, or an employer identification number that is the same as or is
derived from the social security number of that individual.
(ii) Financial account number, or credit card or debit card number
of such individual, combined with any required security code, ac-
cess code, or password that would permit access to such individ-
ual's account.
(iii) State driver's license identification number or State resident
identification number.79
This bill provides that:
[a] covered entity shall develop, implement, maintain, and enforce
a written program for the security of sensitive personal informa-
tion the entity collects, maintains, sells, transfers, or disposes of,
containing administrative, technical, and physical safeguards-
(1) to ensure the security and confidentiality of such data;
(2) to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the se-
curity or integrity of such data; and
(3) to protect against unauthorized access to, or use of such data
that could result in substantial harm to any individual.80
Furthermore, with regards to the requirements of being in compliance
with the standards of the Federal Trade Commission [hereinafter FTC], it
states that "[a] covered entity that is in full compliance with... [the FTC's]
78. Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 1178, 110th Cong. § 11(4) (2007).
79. Id. at § 11(9).
80. Id. at § 2(a).
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rules on Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information and Disposal of
Consumer Report Information and Records is deemed to be in compliance
with the requirements of subsection (a). "8I
With respect to notification of security breaches, Bill 1178 defines
"Breach of Security" as an "unauthorized access to and acquisition of data in
any form or format containing sensitive personal information that com-
promises the security or confidentiality of such information."82 The bill re-
quires notification to consumers when a "covered entity discovers a breach of
security and determines that the breach of security creates a reasonable risk
of identity theft."83 Moreover, the bill defines "reasonable risk of identity
theft" as meaning "that the preponderance of the evidence available to the
covered entity that has experienced a breach of security establishes that iden-
tity theft for one or more individuals from the breach of security is foresee-
able."84 This standard of foreseeability echoes the standard for general
negligence, and establishes a general bias in favor of notification in the event
of a security breach. The bill also includes a list of separate requirements
which would impose a duty on covered entities to give notice to both the
FTC and consumers. 85 In a move that could anger consumer advocate
groups, and would certainly affect how mass data compromise is dealt with
in the court systems; there is no private right of action under the current
version of the bill.86
b) Senate Bills Competing With Bill 1178
Additional and potentially competing Senate Bills are also pending.
For example, Senate Bills 239, 495 and 1202 have been submitted to the
Senate Judiciary Committee for consideration. While there are stark differ-
ences in each piece of proposed legislation, the highlighted features of Sen-
ate Bill 1178 are instructive of the general direction being taken by Senate
lawmakers with regard to potential mass data loss and breach legislation.87
81. Id. at § 2(b).
82. Id. at § 11(1).
83. Id. at § 3(c)(1).
84. Id. at § 11(7).
85. Id. at § 3.
86. See generally Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 1178 (noting that Senate Bill
1178 does not currently provide consumers with a private right of action).
87. See generally Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act of 2007, S. 239, 110th
Cong. (2007); Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, S. 495, 110th
Cong. (2007); Personal Data Protection Act of 2007, S. 1202, 110th Cong.
(2007) (simply illustrating that, while there are additional and emerging
schools of thought in this field of law, Senate Bill 1178 reflects the most popu-
lar school with regards to Senate lawmakers' stance on this type of legislation).
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c) Proposed House Legislation
In addition to the Senate Bill 1178, Bills 1685 and 836 have been pro-
posed in the House of Representatives, and like their upper-house counter-
parts, these potential pieces of legislation vary sharply with one another, yet
they incorporate many of the features found in different state laws already in
place across the country. 88 However, until one or more of these proposed
pieces of legislation becomes law, federal law will remain largely silent on
regulation and private action with respect to mass data loss or mass security
breach. It follows that, pending their enactment, the patchwork of inconsis-
tent state laws will continue to fill the void.
B. Common Law Sources of Liability
In addition to the myriad of statutory sources of liability, businesses in
possession of sensitive consumer information face the prospect of liability
arising from familiar common law causes of action. A small but growing
body of cases have addressed common law claims brought against businesses
that have suffered security breaches resulting in the loss of confidential per-
sonal information.
1. Negligence Actions
Although not always successful, negligence claims are often asserted in
mass data loss lawsuits. For example, in Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare
Alliance, the federal district court for the District of Arizona addressed
claims brought by current and former members of the U.S. military, and their
dependents, seeking to hold Tri-West liable for the loss of their sensitive
personal information.89 Tri-West, a "contractor and agent of the federal gov-
ernment [that] manage[d] a local region of the United States Department of
Defense's health insurance program," suffered a security breach at its Phoe-
nix, Arizona facility during which unauthorized personnel entered the facility
and removed computer hard drives containing the plaintiffs' "names, ad-
dresses, birth dates, and social security numbers."90 Some of the individuals
whose information was compromised filed suit against Tri-West, alleging
"negligence, gross negligence, negligence per se, res ipsa loquitur, breach of
88. See generally Data Security Act of 2007, H.R. 1685, 110th Cong. § (3)-(6)
(2007) (addressing the protection of information and security breach notifica-
tion requirements at the federal and state level and the administrative enforce-
ment of regulations due to a lack of a private right of action); Cyber-Security
Enhancement and Consumer Data Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 836, 110th
Cong. (2007) (enumerating duties of notification owed to law enforcement,
federal agency investigations, and civil and criminal penalties for breach of
such duties).
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implied contract, and violations of the Privacy Act, the Ninth Amendment,
and the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act."91 Two of the plaintiffs, Michael Stol-
lenwerk and Andrea DeGatica, alleged that they suffered losses in the form
of payments made to purchase credit monitoring services in an effort to pro-
tect themselves from identity theft.92 A third plaintiff, Mark Brandt, suffered
actual identity theft when his "personal information was used on six occa-
sions to open or attempt to open unauthorized credit accounts," and "more
than $7,000" was charged to these accounts.93 On Tri-West's motion to dis-
miss pursuant to the Federal Rule Civil Procedure Section 12(b)(6),94 the
court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims "with leave to amend the com-
plaint as to the negligence, Arizona Consumer Fraud Act and Privacy Act
claims."95 Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Com-
plaint alleging "two counts of Privacy Act violations, one count of negli-
gence, one count of consumer fraud under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act,
and one count of breach of contract."96 Nevertheless, the court granted Tri-
West's second motion to dismiss "as to all counts but the negligence
claim."97
Following this dismissal, Tri-West moved "for summary judgment on
the remaining negligence claim."98 In supporting their motion, Tri-West first
argued that plaintiffs Stollenwerk and DeGatica had failed to raise a fact
issue with respect to damages.99 Specifically, defendants maintained that
Stollenwerk and DeGatica had failed to prove that the cost of credit monitor-
ing was an injury sufficient to establish the tort of negligence and that Brandt
had failed to prove causation.OO The court began its analysis of Stol-
lenwerk's and DeGatica's claims by noting the similarities and differences
between cases involving exposure to toxic substances or unsafe products in
which medical monitoring constitutes an actionable injury, and the "exposure
of confidential personal information." 10 Moreover, the court noted that "[i]n
both circumstances the individual may manifest more obvious injury, such as
identity fraud or disease, after some period of time, and in neither instance is
91. Id.
92. Id. at *2.
93. Id. at *1, 5.
94. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
95. Tri-West, 2005 WL 2465906, at *1; see also Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Health
Care, No. 2:03-CV-00185, 2003 WL 22399295 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 2003).








the later manifestation of patent injury guaranteed."102 However, the court
found the claims to be dissimilar, in that toxic tort cases "necessarily and
directly involve human health and safety," while "credit monitoring cases...
do not."103 Ultimately, the court held that this public health interest, in large
part, formed the justification for the "departure from the general rule that
enhanced future risk of injury cannot form the sole basis for a negligence
action."104
The court then concluded that "even if credit monitoring costs were suf-
ficient injury to state a cause of action for negligence in some circum-
stances," Stollenwerk and DeGatica had not presented sufficient evidence to
survive summary judgment.105 The court found that Stollenwerk and DeGat-
ica failed to raise a fact issue as to whether: (1) "the personal information on
the stolen computers was ever exposed to the thieves involved;" (2) their
own risk of suffering identity fraud had "significantly increased;" and (3)
credit monitoring would substantially reduce the risk of identity fraud.106
Accordingly, the court granted TriWest's motion for summary judgment with
respect to Stollenwerk and DeGatica's claims.107
The court then turned to TriWest's assertion that Brandt had failed to
raise a fact issue as to whether the security breach caused the subsequent
theft of his identity.108 The court established that to avoid summary judg-
ment, a "plaintiff must show that causation by the defendant's act or omis-
sion is reasonably likely, not merely possible," and that circumstantial
evidence "must permit a jury to draw reasonable inferences, not merely spec-
ulate or conjecture."109 Examining evidence produced by Brandt, the court
noted six occasions after the burglary on which unknown persons attempted
to open accounts in Brandt's name.'10 After not admitting evidence that one
account was opened using Brandt's former Delaware address, the court held
that the evidence was insufficient to survive summary judgment-specifi-
cally, that "[s]tanding alone ... Brandt's evidence that the burglary preceded
the incidents of identity fraud does not allow a reasonable jury to infer that
the burglary caused the incidents of identity fraud.""l]
102. Id. at *3.
103. Id. at *4.
104. Id.




109. Id. at *5-6.
110. Id. at *6.
111. Id. at *7.
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Stollenwerk is significant for two reasons. First, it effectively bars neg-
ligence claims by individuals whose personal information has been compro-
mised, but who have not yet suffered identity theft or other tangible loss at
the hands of a third party. Because prudence demands that individuals whose
information is compromised take affirmative steps to prevent identity theft,
the Stollenwerk rule prevents a large portion of the costs generated by infor-
mation loss from being shifted onto businesses victimized by information
thieves. Moreover, this rule could extend to unintentional information loss in
which criminal conduct plays no part.
Second, Stollenwerk is significant in that it raises a substantial, although
not insurmountable, hurdle for plaintiffs who seek to establish causation by
requiring some evidence of causation. Mere evidence of a security breach
and exposure of personal information followed by identity theft or other loss
is insufficient because such reasoning invokes the logical fallacy of post hoc
ergo propter hoc.112 In practice, this evidentiary requirement may prove fatal
to numerous claims given that many individuals have given identical per-
sonal information to more than one business.
However, a completely different outcome was the result in a case in-
volving common law claims brought against an entity that experienced a se-
curity breach. In Bell v. Michigan Council 25 of the American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees, ALF-CIO, Local 1023, a group of
911 emergency service operators that suffered identity theft brought suit
against their union alleging that the union's treasurer had compromised their
personal information."3 The treasurer, Yvonne Berry, had frequently taken
work records containing personal information of union members home with
her.114 Her daughter, Dentry Berry, was later arrested for participating in the
appropriation of the service operators' identities.,15 Dentry admitted her in-
volvement in the crime-and was convicted on criminal charges, but denied
taking any of the information from her mother.,16 In a civil suit brought by
the service operators against the union, the investigating officer testified that
she could not conclusively establish how Dentry acquired the lists.",7 The
jury awarded the plaintiffs a collective sum of $275,000 based on a negli-
gence theory of liability, whereupon the union appealed.118
The Michigan Court of Appeals addressed the union's claims that the
trial court erred in denying its motions for directed verdict and judgment
112. Id.
113. Bell v. Mich. Council 25 of the Am. Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employ-
ees, AFL-CIO, Local 1023, 2005 WL 356306 (Mich. App. Feb. 15, 2005).
114. Id. at *4.






notwithstanding the verdict on the theory that the union did not owe the ser-
vice operators a duty to protect them from "the unforeseeable criminal acts of
a third party."19 Additionally, the union argued that no special relationship
existed between itself and its members such that the union had a duty to
protect its members from unforeseeable risks.120 In determining this issue,
the court first began by noting that "[t]he scope and extent of the duty to
protect against third parties is essentially a question of public policy."121 In
its analysis, the court utilized the following factors to consider when deter-
mining whether a special relationship exists:
(1) the societal interests involved, (2) the severity of the risk, (3)
the burden on the defendant, (4) the likelihood of occurrence of
the risk, and (5) the relationship between the parties. Other fac-
tors to consider are the foreseeability of the harm, the defendant's
ability to comply with the duty, the victim's inability to protect
himself, the cost of providing protection, and whether the victim
bestowed any economic benefit on the defendant.122
Applying these factors, the court noted that the relationship between the
union and its members was one of trust in which the union was obligated "to
act on behalf of, and in the best interests of.. ." its members, and "that part
and parcel of that relationship is a responsibility to safeguard its members'
private information."123 The court also observed that "society has a right to
expect that personal information divulged in confidence.., will be guarded
with the utmost care," and that the union was "in the best position to protect
[its members] because it controls who has access to its membership lists."124
Moreover, the court noted that the risk of harm resulting from misuse of the
service operators' personal information was foreseeable based upon evidence
that the union's board members were aware that Berry frequently took lists
containing members' personal information home with her and discussed the
risks of this activity on several occasions.25 The court found that this activ-
ity created a high severity of risk, given the increasing prevalence of identity
theft and the costs associated with remedying it, and that the "commonplace"
nature of identity theft made the risk of loss from criminal acts foreseeable. 126
Additionally, the court observed that the union's burden in securing its mem-
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *2 (quoting Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 379 N.W. 2d 458
(1985)).
122. Id. (quoting Murdock v. Higgins, 217 N.W. 2d 1 (1994)).
123. Id. at *3.
124. Id.
125. Id. at *4-5.
126. Id.
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bers information was not great, but despite this fact, "the union had abso-
lutely no procedures or safeguards in place to ensure that confidential
information was not accessed by unauthorized persons."27
Based on its consideration of these factors, the court concluded that a
special relationship existed between the union and its members such that the
union owed the plaintiffs "a duty to protect them from identity theft by pro-
viding some safeguards to ensure the security of their most essential confi-
dential identifying information."28 The court was careful to limit its holding,
however, noting that it did not intend its holding "to be construed as impos-
ing a duty in every case where a third party has obtained identifying informa-
tion and subsequently uses that information to commit the crime of identity
theft."129 Instead, the court limited its holding "to the facts of this case where
defendant knew confidential information was leaving its premises and no
procedures were in place to ensure the security of the information."130
In Daly v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,131 the Supreme Court of
New York County, New York denied Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany's motion for summary judgment on Daly's claim that it had negligently
allowed custodial workers at its office facility access to her personal informa-
tion and thereby enabled the workers to steal her identity. Daly completed a
life insurance application and sent it to Met-Life. The application required
Daly to provide personal information, including her full name, date of birth,
driver's license number, and her social security number. Upon receipt of
Daly's application, Met-Life forwarded to Daly a copy of its privacy policy
outlining Met-Life's efforts to safeguard customers' personal information.
After Daly's application was made, Met-Life unintentionally allowed custo-
dial staff access to Daly's personal information. The staff members used
Daly's information to commit identity theft by establishing and using numer-
ous credit card accounts in her name. Following discovery of the identity
theft, Daly filed suit against Met-Life alleging two causes of action for negli-
gence. Met-Life moved for summary judgment on Daly's claims, arguing
that Daly could not establish negligence, damages, or foreseeability.
The court rejected Met-Life's arguments and held that summary judg-
ment was not warranted.132 The court found that Daly had provided sensitive
personal information to Met-Life relying on Met-Life's promise that it would
safeguard her information.133 In light of these facts, the court observed that
Daly's claim was "similar to those seen in causes of action for breach of
127. Id. at *5.
128. Id. at *5.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Daly v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 782 N.Y.S. 2d 530 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
132. Id. at 537.
133. Id. at 535.
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fiduciary duty of confidentiality."134 The court found this duty of confidenti-
ality arises from an implied covenant of trust and confidence, and that such a
covenant could be inferred in business dealings where one party placed trust
and confidence in another to exercise discretionary functions for the other
party's benefit.135 The court noted that "[w]hile this concept has never before
been applied to issues surrounding the protection of confidential personal
information, perhaps in the absence of appropriate legislative action, it
should."136 The court then concluded that:
[o]n the papers presented by the parties in this case, this court is
convinced that Met Life had a duty to protect the confidential per-
sonal information provided by the plaintiffs. When Ms. Daly
wished to purchase a life insurance policy from Met Life, she was
required to, and agreed to supply Met Life with highly sensitive
personal information including her full name, her social security
number, and her date of birth. Implicit in this agreement was a
covenant to safeguard this information.137
The court reserved judgment on the questions of whether Daly had ade-
quately established damages, and whether negligence liability could be predi-
cated on the criminal acts of third parties.138
Both Bell and Daly should give pause to businesses engaged in the prac-
tice of collecting the personal information of their customers. Although os-
tensibly limited to its facts, Bell provides that a business with knowledge that
confidential information in its possession is being exposed to potential loss or
theft must take remedial actions to prevent such loss or theft, or else risk tort
liability if the information is compromised and some harm ensues. This rea-
soning assumes that the risk of identity theft is pervasive, and that the risk is
common knowledge such that businesses in possession of sensitive personal
information have a duty to take precautions to mitigate known risks to the
security of the information. Daly reaches beyond the limited holding in Bell
and assigns to businesses in possession of sensitive personal information a
quasi-fiduciary duty to safeguard such information against loss. Notably, the
court in Daly did not engage in an extensive discussion of facts giving rise to
awareness on the part of Met-Life of a significant risk to Daly's information,
nor did it opine about the lack of security measures in place. Rather, the
court's finding of negligence seems to have been predicated solely on the
fact that the information was compromised.
134. Id. at 534.
135. Id. at 535.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 536.
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In Guin v. Brazos Higher Education Service,139 the plaintiff, Guin, as-
serted claims against Brazos based on the theft of a Brazos laptop during the
course of the burglary of a Brazos' employee's home office.140 Guin's
claims were based on Brazos' failure to comply with the duty of care estab-
lished by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act regarding the protection and security
of customer's non-public personal information.14 Guin also asserted a sec-
ond negligence claim based on Brazos' purported failure to comply with its
own privacy policy.142 The court granted Brazos' motion for summary judg-
ment, holding that (1) Guin failed to provide any evidence that Brazos had
failed to comply with Gramm-Leach Bliley,143 and (2) Guin failed to provide
any evidence that Brazos could reasonably foresee that its laptop would be
stolen from the home office of its employee during the course of a bur-
glary.144 The Guin court further noted that even if Guin had been able to
show a breach of duty, the court still would have dismissed his claims be-
cause he had not alleged or shown that he had actually been the victim of
identity theft or suffered economic loss as a result of Brazos' data compro-
mise. 145 Guin teaches the important lesson that a mass security breach does
not inherently result in a viable negligence claim. Courts will continue to
insist that the elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and appropriate
accrued economic damages are satisfied.
2. Breach of Contract and Special Relationship Claims
Negligence is not the only common law claim arising from information
security breaches. For instance, in Kuhn v. Capital One Financial Corp.,146
the Massachusetts Superior Court ruled on a motion for summary judgment
against a complaint alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, misrepresentation, breach of
139. Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv., 2006 WL 288483 at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 7,
2006).
140. Id.
141. Id. at *3.
142. Id. at *4.
143. Id.
144. Id. at *6.
145. Id. at *5-6; see also Giordano v. Wachovia Secs., No. 06-476 (JBS), 2006 WL
2177036, at *4 (D. N.J. July 31, 2006) (plaintiffs claims based on data loss
failed because data loss had not resulted in theft of identity - fear and threat of
identity theft arising from data loss are insufficient); Forbes v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1019-21 (D. Minn. 2006) (dismissing negligence
and breach of contract claims arising from theft of computer containing sensi-
tive consumer information because plaintiff failed to establish either accrued
damages or a reasonable certainty of damages in the future).
146. Kuhn v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. CA015177, 2004 WL 3090707, at *1
(Mass. Sup. Nov. 30, 2004).
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fiduciary duty, and invasion of privacy. The plaintiff, Kuhn, brought these
claims after an unidentified computer hacker broke into the website server of
a merchant that accepted payment via Capital One Visa. The hacker gained
access to Kuhn's Capital One Visa card information. On the same day, Capi-
tal One contacted Kuhn to inform her that it had shut down her account.
Kuhn later spoke with a Capital One representative who told her that no
further action was necessary on her part. Capital One also sent her a letter to
the same effect. Within days of the hacking incident, "approximately eigh-
teen (18) fraudulent accounts were opened in plaintiff's name, and $25,000
was wrongfully charged."147 Kuhn filed suit against Capital One, and Capital
One subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims.
Turning first to Kuhn's breach of contract claim, the court found that
Capital One's Privacy Notice and Customer Agreement, which provided that
"we [Capital One] can protect you from identity theft, fraud, and unautho-
rized access to personal information about you[,]" governed Kuhn's relation-
ship with Capital One.148 Kuhn argued that this provision obligated Capital
One to inform her that she needed to contact credit reporting agencies and
place a fraud alert on her account in order to prevent identity theft. The court
first noted that the provision applied only to Kuhn's Capital One account. 149
The court then found that the provision was located within a section of the
Privacy Notice titled "Why we may collect and share information[," indicat-
ing that it was not a guarantee against illicit use so much as an invitation to
share information.150 The court also observed that the Privacy Notice con-
tained a link to Capital One's website for persons who wanted to learn more
about the policy.151 Noting that the link made Kuhn aware that the written
Privacy Notice was not the only source of information about the policy, the
court proceeded to find that the website contained the very information that
Kuhn claimed Capital One had failed to provide.i52 The court then observed
that the Privacy Notice contained no guarantees against illicit use in the event
of a lost or stolen card and limited Kuhn's liability for wrongful charges to
fifty dollars - a term that Capital One had honored by not holding Kuhn
personally liable for the fraudulent charges to her account. 5 3 Based on these
findings, the court granted Capital One's motion for summary judgment on
Kuhn's contract claim.154 The court likewise rejected Kuhn's claim for
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing on grounds that
147. Id.





153. Id. at *4.
154. Id.
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Capital One had fulfilled its contractual obligations by notifying her of the
breach and deactivating her account.1 55
The court next turned to Kuhn's negligence count. Finding that Kuhn
produced no evidence that Capital One provided her personal information -
such as her social security number, date of birth, pin number, or mother's
maiden name - to retail establishments, the court concluded that the disclo-
sure of Kuhn's credit card number could not have caused identity theft.156
The court rejected Kuhn's misrepresentation claim on a similar ground, find-
ing no evidence that Capital One was aware of the disclosure of any informa-
tion beyond Kuhn's credit card number.157 Given this lack of evidence,
Kuhn could not establish that Capital One's statement that she need not "take
any further action" was fraudulently or negligently made.158 Turning next to
Kuhn's breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court held that Capital One's rela-
tionship to Kuhn was one of creditor-debtor and that no fiduciary duties
arose from this relationship.159 Lastly, the court rejected Kuhn's invasion of
privacy claim because she produced no evidence to show that Capital One
bore any responsibility for the security breach.160
On appeal, the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed the judge's grant
of summary judgment on all counts, citing Kuhn's affidavit, which stated "at
least one Capital One representative had told her that 'the security breach had
occurred at Capital One."161 In doing so, however, the court acknowledged
that Kuhn's assertion "may only provide [her] a toehold, which may very
well disappear through later discovery."62
Kuhn is significant because it highlights the importance of conveying
accurate information to consumers whose personal information is compro-
mised. Given the notification requirements adopted in most states, busi-
nesses that experience breaches must not only concern themselves with
notifying affected consumers, but also with accurately notifying consumers
about appropriate steps to take. It would be a sad irony for a business to
notify a customer in an effort to comply with a notification statute only to be
held liable on a misrepresentation theory for negligently conveying incorrect
information that causes the consumer additional loss.
155. Id.
156. Id. at *5.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at *6.
160. Id. The court also disposed of one last claim based on the Massachusetts decep-
tive trade practices statute. Id. at *7.
161. Kuhn v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 05-P-810, 2006 WL 3007931, at *2, *3
(Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 23, 2006).
162. Id. at *3.
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In Jones v. Commerce Bancorp, Inc.,163 the plaintiff, Jones, claimed
commercial bad faith, consumer fraud, intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of con-
tract. In May of 2005, several Commerce employees were arrested for the
theft of large amounts of confidential information from the company's
databases.164 On May 22, 2005, Jones learned that funds were missing from
her business checking account and that a separate, fraudulent account had
been opened in her name. 165 Commerce eventually credited the fraudulently
withdrawn funds back to Jones' account. 166 The court granted Commerce's
motion to dismiss on the commercial bad faith, consumer fraud and infliction
of emotional distress claims, but found that Jones had successfully stated
claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. 67
In upholding the negligence claim, the court relied on Jones' allegations
that Commerce knew of the fraudulent activity within its branch network and
failed to stop it.168 In refusing to dismiss Jones' claim for breach of fiduciary
duty, the court reasoned that, given that Jones was required to submit confi-
dential data to Commerce, and that Commerce's "Booklet with Deposit
Rules, Regulations, Disclosures and Privacy Notice" represented that such
data was protected by a variety of measures, "[u]nder these circumstances,
plaintiff was entitled to rely on Commerce's superior expertise to safeguard
her personal confidential information."]69
In her pleadings, Jones characterized Commerce's "Booklet with De-
posit Rules, Regulations, Disclosures and Privacy Notice" as a contract.
Jones alleged that this "contract" was breached when Commerce allowed
unauthorized withdrawals from Jones' account. 70 Commerce did not chal-
lenge Jones' interpretation of the Booklet as a contract, but rather, claimed
that since it replaced the fraudulently withdrawn funds, there could not have
been damages from any breach.171 The court disagreed, reasoning that
"[p]laintiff may be able to prove some (albeit minimal) damages stemming
from her inability to access her funds for several weeks prior to their restora-
tion by Commerce."172
163. Jones v. Comm. Bancorp, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 835(HB), 2006 WL 1409492, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006).
164. Id. at *1.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *5.
168. Id. at *3.
169. Id.
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Jones is noteworthy in that it suggests, first, that booklets and similar
literature describing security policies could conceivably be construed as con-
tracts between the institutions promulgating them and victims of identity
theft.173 Second, Jones proposes that the inability to access funds for a short
period of time due to identity theft could itself be sufficient to show damages
in a claim for breach of contract. 74
3. Risk Of Future Injury Insufficient
In Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc., the plaintiff, on behalf of
herself and a class of similarly situated individuals, brought suit against
DSW Shoe Warehouse after the breach of DSW's consumer information
database.175 Although Hendricks's information was not used for any fraudu-
lent purposes, Hendricks purchased credit monitoring services to protect
against future identity theft. Hendricks sought, as damages, the costs of the
credit monitoring services she purchased.176 DSW moved to dismiss the
claims asserted against it.177 The court granted DSW's motion on the
grounds that the plaintiff had not suffered a legally recognizable injury.178
Because the plaintiff had not been the victim of actual identity theft, she had
no legally recognizable injury:
There is no existing Michigan statutory or case law authority to
support plaintiff's position that the purchase of credit monitoring
constitutes either actual damages or a cognizable loss. Indeed,
there is reason to believe that Michigan's highest court would re-
ject a novel legal theory of damages which is based on a risk of
injury at some indefinite time in the future.179
Because identity theft is the concern most often associated with a mass
data breach, many consumer-plaintiffs have advanced legal theories that al-
lege damages arising from the fear or risk of future identity theft. Hendricks,
and other decisions like it, demonstrate that damage claims based on a future
risk of injury are founded on shaky ground. The emerging trend seems to be
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 776 (W.D.
Mich. 2006).
176. Id. at 777.
177. Id. at 778.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 783. See also Bell v. Acxiom, No. 4:06CV00485-WRW, 2006 WL
2850042, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006) (holding that the plaintiff did not have
standing to sue under the case-or-controversy requirement since she did not
have evidence to show that her personal information was included in a recent
data loss and since she had not suffered any damages other than an increased
risk of identity theft).
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that actual theft of identity or unauthorized charges are a prerequisite for a
successful claim based on a mass data breach.
4. Claims Brought by Parties other than Consumers after Mass
Data Compromise
Three interrelated cases arising from the breach of a wholesaler's elec-
tronic records are worth examining in detail: Pennsylvania State Employees
Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank ("PSECU"),8o Sovereign Bank v. BJ's
Wholesale Club, Inc., (Sovereign Bank)181, and Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ's
Wholesale Club, Inc.182
In PSECU, the plaintiff brought claims for breach of contract, negli-
gence, equitable indemnification, and unjust enrichment against BJ's Whole-
sale Club and Fifth Third Bank, who processed BJ's Visa card
transactions.183 In PSECU, the court considered several claims brought by
PSECU against BJ's Wholesale Club, a Visa merchant that accepted Visa
card transactions from its customers, and Fifth Third Bank, an acquiring bank
that processed Visa card transactions on behalf of BJ's. The lawsuit arose
after unauthorized third parties obtained access to BJ's electronic records and
stole Visa card magnetic-strip information from over 20,000 Visa cards is-
sued by PSECU. BJ's software had improperly stored consumers' informa-
tion instead of deleting it upon completion of each transaction, thereby
enabling the thieves to access and steal the magnetic-strip information from
over 20,000 Visa cards issued by PSECU. As damages, PSECU sought the
cost of replacing the cards that had been compromised by the breach of BJ's
system.184 Fifth Third and BJ's filed separate motions to dismiss under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that none of PSECU's claims stated a valid cause
of action.,85
180. Penn. St. Em. Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, 398 F. Supp. 2d 317 (M.D. Pa.
2005).
181. Sovereign Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 183, 187 (M.D.
Pa. 2005).
182. Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 206 (M.D. Pa.
2006).
183. PSECU, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 319-20.
184. Id. at 323.
185. Id. at 320. In addition to these claims, BJ's filed a third-party complaint
against IBM seeking indemnity for any damages received by PSECU. BJ's had
contracted with IBM to provide credit card payment processing software, and
had specifically requested that IBM disable the "Store and Forward" feature,
which stored credit card data accepted after the software was taken off-line for
processing when the system came back on-line. IBM failed to disable the
"Store and Forward" feature, and BJ's alleged that this failure contributed to
the loss of consumer data. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania granted IBM's motion to dismiss in part in Pennsylvania State
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Looking first to PSECU's claims against BJ's, the court held that
PSECU's breach of contract claim failed because PSECU was not a third-
party-beneficiary of the contract between BJ's and Fifth Third Bank.186 BJ's
and Fifth Third had entered into credit and debit card processing agreements
which prohibited BJ's from disclosing Visa cardholder account information
to unauthorized third parties, and from retaining or storing Visa magnetic
strip data subsequent to transaction authorization. The agreements also con-
tained explicit disclaimers stating that they were not made for the benefit of,
and could not be enforced by, any third party. Based on these disclaimers,
PSECU's breach of contract argument was rejected.187
The court next held that PSECU's negligence claim was barred by the
economic loss rule.188 Pennsylvania's economic loss rule was described as
barring "negligence claims seeking recovery for 'economic damages' or
'losses' unless there has also been physical injury either to a person or prop-
erty."89 Significantly, the court rejected PSECU's argument that the eco-
nomic loss doctrine did not apply because the data security breach caused a
complete loss of all Visa cards rendered useless by the breach.190 The court
held that "[a] plaintiff must show physical damage to property, not its tangi-
ble nature," and that "costs of replacing the cards" were economic losses.191
The court then addressed PSECU's equitable indemnification and unjust
enrichment claims. The court dismissed PSECU's equitable indemnification
claim on grounds that PSECU had paid no damages for which it was entitled
to receive indemnification; rather, it had merely fulfilled a contractual obliga-
tion to its customers by replacing their Visa cards after the cards were com-
promised.192 Further, the court dismissed PSECU's unjust enrichment claim
on grounds that the replacement of the cards by PSECU did not confer a
benefit on BJ's because the replacement was done in fulfillment of PSECU's
contractual responsibility to its customers, and any benefit conferred on BJ's
was incidental.193
Employees Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 1:CV-04-1554, 2005 WL
1154594, at *13 (M.D. Pa. May 3, 2005), and dismissed the balance of BJ's
claims against IBM as moot in PSECU. 398 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
186. PSECU, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 323-26.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 326-30.
189. Id. at 327.
190. Id. at 330.
191. Id. Turning to Pennsylvania state law, the court also rejected PSECU's conten-
tion that the economic loss doctrine applies only when the plaintiff and defen-
dant are in privity of contract. Id. at 329.
192. Id. at 330.
193. Id. at 331.
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Turning to PSECU's claims against Fifth Third Bank, the court dis-
missed PSECU's negligence, equitable indemnification, and unjust enrich-
ment claims on largely the same grounds it relied upon to reject PSECU's
claims against BJ's. However, the court refused to dismiss PSECU's breach
of contract claim against Fifth Third. PSECU alleged that it was a third-
party-beneficiary of a contract between Visa and Fifth Third requiring Fifth
Third to provide assurances that its merchants (such as BJ's) would comply
with Visa's operating regulations, which prohibited the disclosure and reten-
tion of account and magnetic-strip information, and required Fifth Third to
take responsibility for losses caused by a merchant's failure to abide by the
regulations. The court found that this provision in the contract between Visa
and Fifth Third was made for the purpose of securing the Visa card network
in a way that directly benefited issuing banks such as PSECU, and that this
purpose was within the contemplation of the parties at the time of con-
tracting.194 The court concluded:
The purpose of the agreement was to make the Visa network safe
for issuing banks, either those already in the network or those con-
templating joining it, by assuring them that their customer infor-
mation will only be in a merchant's possession long enough to
make a transaction. Thus, the third-party-beneficiary relationship
for issuing banks was within the contemplation of Visa and Fifth
Third at the time of contracting. Further, since Visa intended to
give issuing banks like PSECU the benefit of Fifth Third's per-
formance, PSECU has third-party-beneficiary status under Fifth
Third's member agreement with Visa.195
Demonstrating the unsettled nature of the law in this area, on Fifth
Third's second motion for reconsideration, the court then reversed itself,
holding that PSECU was not an intended third-party-beneficiary of the con-
tract. 96 The court's ruling hinged on a new determination that Visa did not
intend for PSECU to benefit from its contract with Fifth Third. 197 Therefore,
whether Fifth Third intended PSECU to be a third-party beneficiary to its
agreement with Visa was irrelevant because both parties to the agreement
were required to have the intent to benefit PSECU for PSECU's contract
claim to survive.198
The court reached a slightly different result in Sovereign Bank. There,
Sovereign Bank asserted claims against BJ's based on the fact that some of
the stolen credit card information belonged to customers of Sovereign
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Bank.99 Sovereign Bank's damages were based on the new cards it issued to
its customers, as well as the reimbursements it made to its customers for
unauthorized charges arising from the BJ's breach.200 The court dismissed
Sovereign's breach of contract claim, finding that Sovereign was not a third-
party-beneficiary of BJ's contract with Visa.201 However, the court deter-
mined that BJ's owed Sovereign's customers a duty of care, which was not
excused by the criminal acts of the identity thieves.202 The court also deter-
mined that Sovereign had a valid third party breach of contract claim against
Fifth Third.203 Thus, Sovereign was able to maintain its negligence claim
against BJ's and its contract claim against Fifth Third.204
In the Banknorth case, the Court took an entirely different approach,
even though the facts and claims were almost identical to the Sovereign Bank
case.205 There, the Court dismissed each of the plaintiff's claims against BJ's
and Fifth Third, held that Banknorth was not a third-party beneficiary to the
BJ' s-Visa-Fifth Third contracts, and found that Banknorth's negligence claim
against BJ's failed under Maine's economic-loss rule.206
The inconsistent holdings in these three cases demonstrate how unset-
tled the law of data loss and breach is, especially where the underlying
claims are between parties other than the consumers affected by the data
breach. On identical facts and claims, three plaintiffs obtained very different
results. Despite their inconsistent results, these cases are indicators of the
analysis a court will likely undertake when examining the liability of third
parties who are indirectly damaged by a data breach.
5. Deceptive Trade Practices Liability
Private litigants have struggled to maintain deceptive trade practices
claims against companies based on security breaches or compromises of per-
sonal information. However, in United States v. Choicepoint, Inc., the FTC
asserted deceptive trade practices claims against Choicepoint.207 The FTC
alleged that Choicepoint had allowed several imposters to access sensitive
information contained in Choicepoint's database.208 Although the claims re-
199. Sovereign Bank, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 187.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 191.
202. Id. at 193-96.
203. Id. at 203.
204. Id. at 206.
205. Banknorth, 2006 WL 1004543, at * 207-210.
206. Id. at *216.





ceiving the most publicity were all based on impermissible access under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, the FTC also based their claims on Choicepoint's
failure to protect the sensitive personal information contained in its database
as advertised in its privacy policy statement. 209 Based on those representa-
tions by Choicepoint, the FTC made deceptive trade practices claims against
Choicepoint under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC
Act").210
Ultimately, the FTC and Choicepoint entered into a stipulated final
judgment and order for civil penalties.211 The stipulation included an agree-
ment that the FTC's deceptive trade practices claims stated a claim on which
relief could be granted. Choicepoint paid a $10,000,000 civil penalty, partly
based on those claims.
The Choicepoint case may be distinguishable for two reasons. First,
only the FTC can assert FTC Act deceptive trade practices claims. Second, a
stipulated final judgment entered by the court may not be as indicative as a
contested judgment of the direction the law is going. However, the Choice-
point case suggests that deceptive trade practices claims may be a viable
cause of action where representations regarding privacy and security have
been made by a company who subsequently suffers a mass security breach.
C. Key Case To Watch In 2006 and 2007
There are several cases pending across the country that have arisen from
the front-page data loss and data breach stories discussed earlier in this arti-
cle. Even in instances where the mass data loss and data breach have not
resulted in identity theft, consumers have asserted claims against the entities
they have deemed responsible for the potential compromise of their personal
information. Because of the uncertainty of the law surrounding data loss and
data breach, the outcome of those claims is uncertain. The case that may be
most indicative of corporate exposure to data loss, and the subsequent poten-
tial recovery for consumers, is Parke v. Cardsystems Solutions, Inc..2 I2 Al-
though the Parke case is currently subject to an automatic stay due to the
bankruptcy of one of the defendants, the case could be the best possible indi-
cator of where the law of data loss and breach is headed once the stay is
lifted.213
209. Id.
210. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
211. Stipulated Final Judgment, United States v. Choicepoint, Inc., No. 106-CV-
0198 (N.D. Ga. filed Feb. 10, 2006).
212. Parke v. Cardsystems Solutions, Inc., No. CGC-05-442624 (Cal. Super. Ct.-
San Francisco filed June 27, 2005).
213. Parke v. Cardsystems Solutions, Inc., No. C 06-04857 WHA, 2006 WL
2917604, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006) (plaintiffs removed the case to federal
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452 which allows for removal of actions related
to bankruptcy proceedings). In October of 2006, the District Court remanded
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In Parke, Cardsystems acted as a third-party data processing vendor for
both VISA and Mastercard.214 Computer hackers allegedly hacked into Card-
systems' computer database, then compromised and stole consumer data re-
lating to approximately forty million consumers. 215 As a result, a class action
was filed against Cardsystems, VISA, Mastercard, and other defendants in
California Superior Court. The class action plaintiffs asserted claims under
California's data loss and breach statute, as well as claims for negligence and
deceptive trade practices.
The Parke case is significant for two reasons. First, the class plaintiffs
have asserted claims under the California statute that has served as a model
for most of the other state legislation passed or pending regarding data loss or
data breach. Second, the class plaintiffs have asserted that they suffered from
unauthorized charges on their credit cards. Thus, Parke offers a case with
alleged actual damages resulting from consumer identity theft, a representa-
tive statutory regulatory scheme, a private right of action, and additional
causes of action that have not yet been fully tested.
VI. CONCLUSION
Consumers, corporations, and the lawyers representing them are on the
cusp of a new legal frontier. Five years ago, a mass security breach or mass
data loss was an afterthought as individual identity theft cases captured the
attention of the media and filled court dockets. Three years ago, the first
comprehensive statute dealing with mass data loss and breach was enacted in
California. Today, mass compromises of consumer information are often
front-page news. Laptops are stolen, computer disks and reports are lost in
the mail, rogue employees are improperly accessing data from the inside, and
skilled hackers and crime rings are stealing information from the outside.
Even as mass data loss and breach becomes predictable and common-
place, uncertainty remains regarding the law that relates to these incidents.
Inconsistent statutory schemes remain relegated to some, but not all, states.
Competing federal laws wait in the wings to preempt the field. In the
meantime, corporate counsel struggles to determine what conduct complies
with the law when a mass data compromise occurs, and both consumer law-
yers and courts struggle to determine when a viable claim based on a mass
data loss of breach can be brought.
Until more common law precedent is developed and a comprehensive
statutory scheme is in place that governs all consumer information regardless
the action back to State Court on equitable grounds, noting specifically that
plaintiff's claims are all based on state law and implicate issues on which Cali-
fornia courts have yet to rule. Parke, 2006 WL 2917604, at *4.
214. First Amended Complaint at [ 7, Parke v. Cardsystems Solutions, Inc., No
CGC-05-442424 (Cal. Super Ct.-San Francisco filed July 6, 2005).
215. First Amended Complaint at 14-19, Parke v. Cardsystems Solutions, Inc.
No. CGC-05-442424 (Cal. Super. Ct.-San Francisco filed July 6, 2005).
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of the consumer's residence, representatives of consumers and corporations
would do well to look to the California statutory scheme for compliance, and
assume common law claims will be limited to incidents where a consumer
suffers actual damages as a result of identity theft arising from a mass data
breach or loss.
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Arkansas ARK. CODE 8/12/2005 No Yes Covers infor-
ANN. §§ 4- mation in
110-101 to - physical or
108 non-electronic
form




Colorado COLO. REV. 9/1/2006 No Yes
STAT. § 6-1-
716
Connecticut CONN. GEN. 1/1/2006 No Yes Government
STAT. § 36A- entities not
701b required to
provide notice.




District of D.C. CODE 1/1/2007 Yes No
Columbia §§ 28-3851 to
-3853
Florida FLA. STAT. 7/1/2005 No Yes 45-day dead-
§ 817.5681 line for notifi-
cation.
Georgia GA. CODE 5/5/2005 No No Covers infor-
ANN. §§ 10-1- mation brokers
910 to -912 only.
Hawaii HAW. REV. 1/1/2007 Yes Yes Precludes
STAT. actions against
§§ 487N-1 to government
-4 agencies.
Idaho IDAHO CODE 7/1/2006 No Yes
ANN. §§ 28-
51-104 to -107
Illinois 815 ILL. 1/1/2006 No No
COMP. STAT.
530/1 to /20
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Kansas KAN. STAT. 1/1/2007 No Yes
ANN. § 50-
7a01




Maine ME. REV. 1/31/2006 No No Covers Infor-
STAT. ANN. mation Brokers
tit. 10, §§ 1346 only.
to 1350-A
Michigan MICH. COMP. 7/2/2007 No Yes
LAWS ANN.
§ 445.72
Minnesota MINN. STAT. 1/1/2006 No No
§ 325E.61




Nebraska NEB. REV. 7/14/2006 No Yes Protects
STAT. §§ 87- "unique bio-




Nevada NEV. REV. 1/1/2006 No No Data collector
STAT. can sue one
§§ 603A.010 who misappro-
to .920 priates infor-
mation for cost
of notice.
New N.H. REV. 1/1/2007 Yes Yes
Hampshire STAT. ANN.
§§ 359-C: 19 to
:21
New Jersey N.J. STAT. 1/1/2006 No Yes
ANN. § 56:8-
163
New York N.Y. GEN. 12/7/2005 No No
BUS. LAW
§ 899-aa
North Carolina N.C. GEN. 12/1/2005 Yes Yes
STAT. §§ 75-
60 to -65
North Dakota N.D. CENT. 6/1/2005 No No
CODE §§ 51
30-01 to -07
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Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. 6/8/2006 No No Applies to
tit. 74, government
§ 3113.1 agencies only.




Rhode Island R.I. GEN. 3/1/2006 No Yes
LAWS §§ 11-
49.2-1 to -7
Tennessee TENN. CODE 7/1/2005 Yes No
ANN. § 47-18-
2107





Utah UTAH CODE 1/1/2007 No Yes
ANN. § 13-44-
101 to -301
Vermont VT. STAT. 1/1/2007 No Yes
ANN. tit. 9,
§ 2430
Washington WASH. REV. 7/24/2005 Yes Yes
CODE
§ 19.255.010
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. 3/31/2006 No Yes Protects DNA
§ 895.507 and biometric
data.
